




A very r.ecent case in England, before the Lord Justices of
Appeal,' has set at rest the long controversy as to the extent to
which a voluntary assignment or settlement of a mere equitable
interest, or of choses in action, will be enforced in a Court of
Chancery. The question has always been one of considerable
difficulty and importance, while the conclusion finally come to is at
variance with the admitted tendency of the later authorities. On
both these grounds, the decisi6n is worthy at least of a passing no-
tice, and we purpose, therefore, to devote to its examination, a few
pages of this journal.
Perhaps the most often repeated maxim of equity is, that the
Court never interferes in favor of a mere volunteer. Indeed, this
is involved in the very nature of the system, which is not original
and independent, but merely ancillary and supplemental. The
Court of Chancery has from the beginning, confined itself to the
enforcement of these claims, which, while there was no adequate
remedy for them at law, it would be contrary to conscience to
'Kekewitch vs. Manning, 1 De Gex, Mac. & Gord. 176; 12 Engl. L. & Eq. 120.
25
VOLUNTARY ASSIGNMENTS.
resist. This "conscience" has perhaps grown in the course of
time, to be a merely artificial and technical thing; as much bound
by precedents as the law itself, but the idea and ground plan have
never altered. It lies on the complainant always to make out a
case of equitable right on his part, before the peculiar machinery
of the Court can be set in motion. Now, however it may be in
other countries, it is of the very structure of our law, that in order
to constitute a binding contract, engagement or obligatien of any
kind, in the absence of any particular formality, there must be
something more than a mere intention of bounty, however decidedly
entertained or strongly expressed. Some consideration is needed
to give vitality to the obligation or promise. It is not necessary to
enter into any defence of this doctrine, which is perhaps the only
one possible in a trading people; it is sufficient that it is ours.
Under this view, a volunteer has as against a donor or promisor, or
those actually representing him, no equity whatever. There is no
s ch thing to be admitted, as a compulsion to benevolence or libe-
rality, as it is said there is none to mercy. It has therefore always
been ruled that a Court of Chancery 'will not lend its aid to perfect
any voluntary conveyance or transaction whatever;' and in this
respect, equity goes even farther than law, in disregarding altogether
the technical effect of a seal, in creating an artificial consideration.
2
Thus much may be considered as perfectly clear. But there is
another principle which is equally well founded, and equally of the
essence of the 'doctrine of equity; but which starting from a
different point, is sometimes difficult to reconcile with that just
stated.
Where property, real or personal, is held in the name of a trus-
tee, a chancellor now, as in the days of uses, treats the ce8tui que
trust as absolute owner, and subjects the equitable estate to his dis-
I Colman vs. Sarell, 8 Bro. C. C., 12; Adams' Eq. 79; Hill on Trustees, 83;
Bunn vs. Winthrop, 1 J. C. R. 329; Hayes vs. Kershaw, 1 Sandf. Ch. 261; Denni-
son vs. Goehring, 7 Barr, 175; Bank vs. May, 3 A. K. Marsh, 436.
2Ellison vs. Ellison, 6 Ves. 656; Cotteen vs. Missing, 1 Madd. 176: Kekewitch
vs. Manning, ut supr., though see Caldwell vs. Williams, 1 Bail. Eq. 175; McIntire
vs. Hughes, 4 Bibb. 186.
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position, exactly as a court of law would do the legal -estate, did
he possess it. Any valid act on his part is considered to affect the
conscience of the trustee ; just as would a direction by a principal
to his agent. -thus conveyances and assignments good at law,
even such as would seem applicable only to legal estates, as a com-
mon recovery, are enforced in equity. It is plain, then, that in
this point of view there is nothing to prevent the cestui que trust
from transferring his interest by gift, any more than for considera-
tion; for the trustee has as little right to object in the one case as
the other. So far consequently, as from the nature.of the property,
or the mode of transfer, the further aid of the donor is unnecessary
to perfect the gift; that is, where the transaction is complete; there
is no reason why equity should withhold its assistance from the
donee as against strangers.
Of course it is immaterial whether this gift of the equitable in-
terest be cotemporaneous with, or subsequent to the creation of the
trust.
But the main difficulty has not been touched. The question still
remains, when is a transfer of such an interest perfect, and the
transaction complete? - The case of a direct immediate trust,
where notice has been given to the trustee, and has been acted on,
or the legal estate is transferred at the same time, or where the
party by an express declaration makes himself a trustee, is free
from embarrassment. There if the donor repents of his act, it is
he or some volunteer, who must ask the assistance of the court, to
unravel what has been done, and. to revest in him what he has
parted with; and for that he certainly has no equity.' This has,
however, been rarely called in question; it is to another class of
cases that we refer.
Contingencies and possibilities, choses in action, such as debts,
stock, policies of insurance, and all reversionary interests in per-
sonalty, are not capable of transfer by any means known to the
law; but, in equity, they may unquestionably be assigned for a
I See Exparte Pye, 18 Ves. 140; Bill vs. Cureton, 2 My. & K. 503; Wheatley vs.
Purr, 1 Keen, 551; McFadden vs. Jenkins, 1 Phil. 153; Rycroft vs. Christy, 3
Beav. 238; Collinson vs. Patrick, 2 Keen, 123.
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valuable consideration; the assignor being treated as trustee for the
assignee, and bound to permit the use of his name, in order to the
recovery of the money or property. To make t. tradAction com-
plete, in England, notice to the debtor or trustee is necessary,'
though in America, in general, this is not required to the title of
the transferree. 2 The ground in these cases for the interference of
the Court is, as it once was in the creation of uses on the sale of
land, that it would be inequitable for the assignor to refuse to per-
form his contract.
Suppose, now, the owner of such property wishes to make a gift
of it. As he cannot transfer the title at law; nor, if ce8tui que tru8t
himself, can equity, following the law, confer upon him any greater
capacity of disposition, than if he were actually the holder of the
legal title; is it sufficient for him to do all that is in his power, by
manifesting distinctly his intention to transfer his equitable inte-
rest; or, on the other hand, will the Court treat it simply as an
agreement to transfer, and therefore refuse its assistance to the
assignee, as being a mere volunteer? On this question the cases
have been very greatly in conflict, until the decision which we have
referred to above, KEekewitch vs. Manning, which has at last set-
tied the law, at least for England.
Before stating this case, however, we shall refer briefly to the
prior decisions in order to a clear understanding of the extent and
limits of the doctrine which it establishes.
As was remarked by Chancellor Kent, in:Bunn vs. Winthrop,3
there seems to have been much floating and unsettled opinion on
these questions in the earlier cases. Coleman vs. Sarell is usu-
ally referred to as the first which has laid down any definite rule
on the subject. There a voluntary deed had been executed, pur-
porting to be an assignment of stock to trustees, for J. S., a stran-
ger, and her children; and in case the assignor survived them, he
covenanted to pay the dividends for the benefit of the children.
Lord Thurlow refused to support the assignment, remarking,
'See the cases in notes to Ryall vs. Rowles, 2 Lead. Cases Eq. p. 2, 2D9.
2 Ibid, page 236, &c. 3 1 John. Ch. B& 836.
4 3 Br. C. C. 12; 1 Ves. jr. 50.
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"Whenever you come into equity to raise an interest by way of
trust, you must have a valuable, or at least a meritorious consider-
ation." This was followed in Elison, vs. Ellison,' which was a vol-
untary settlement of leaseholds, &c., upheld by Lord Eldon. The
latter stated the distinction thus: "If you want the assistance of
the Court to constitute you cestui que trust, and the instrument is
voluntary, you shall not have that assistance for the purpose of cre-
ating you cestui que trust. As upon a covenant to transfer stock;
if it rests in covenant, and is purely voluntary, this Court will not
execute that voluntary covenant; but if the party has completely
transferred stock, &c., though it is voluntary, yet the legal con-
veyance being effectually made, the equitable interest will be
enforced." In .Ex parte Pye,2 a case of an express declaration of
trust of stock in the declaror's name, and also sustained, much the
same language is used by the same learned judge. And in Bunn
vs. Winthrop,3 and other American decisions, this distinction has been
quoted and acted on.
Other cases illustrate and develop the rule. Thus, in Antrobus
vs. Smith,4 there was an endorsement on a receipt for one of the
subscriptions to a navigation company, purporting to be an assign-
ment to the assignor's daughter, of all his right, title and inter-
est in the call, and it was endeavored 'to support this as a declara-
tion of trust; but Sir W. Grant refused to enforce the assignment,
on the ground that it could pass no title in itself, and that the party
could not be compelled to complete an imperfect gift. On the
same ground a memorandum endorsed on a bond, accompanied by
delivery ;' a voluntary assignment of stock and shares by deed poll
incapable of passing such property ;6 an assignment by deed of a
contingent interest in personalty;7 or of turnpike or road bonds or
shares," have each been held ineffectual to transfer any interest therein.
16 Yes. 656. 2 18 Ves. 140. 3 1 J. C. R. 329.
4 12 Ves. 39. 5 Edwards vs. Jones, 1 My. & Cr. 226.
6 Dillon vs. Coppin, 4 My. & Cr. 647.
7 Meek vs. Kettlewell, 1 Hare, 464; 1 Phill. 342.
8 s Searle vs. Law, 15 Sim. 95; see also Colman vs. Sarel, 3 Brown C. C. 12; Hol-
loway vs. Headington, 8 Sim. 324; Beatson va. Beatson, 13 Sim. 281.
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A material distinction is made between a voluntary assignment
of stock, or other choses in action, and a direct declaration of
trust of the same species of property. In the former case, the
party manifests no intention of becoming a trustee, and can be only
made so by the construction of equity; in the latter, the Court only
acts on-the expressed intention.'
There are:other decisions, however, which it has been found dif-
ficult to reconcile with those just stated. Sloane vs. Cadogan2 is a
case which has caused great discussion in this respect. There,
Cadogan, who had an equitable reversionary interest in a fund
vested in trustees, assigned to other trustees on trusts for volun-
teers. It was urged by Sir Edward Sugden, in arguing the case, that
the settlement was ineffectual, as the property was incapable of actual
transfer, and that the settler did all he could under the circumstances
was not enbugh. But Sir-W. Grant held that a complete trust had
been created. He said) "The Court will not interfere to give perfec-
tion to the instrument; but you may constitute one a trustee for a
volunteer. Here the fund was vested in trustees ; Mr. W..Cadogan
had an equitable reversionary interest in that fund, and he assigned
it to certain trustees, and then the first trustees are trustees for his
assigns, and they may come here; for, when the trust is treated, no
coiisideration is essential, and the Court will execute it, though
voluntary." It is to be observed in this case, that there was no
claim against the donor, or his representatives, and, therefore, the
assistance of the Court was not invoked in aid of the assignment.
Two subsequent cases follow and support Sloane vs. Cadogan.
The first of these, Fortescue vs. Barnett,3 was a decision of Sir
John Leach. There had been an assignment by deed, of a policy
of insurance on the iassignor's life, in trust for volunteers. The
deed was delivered to the trustees; but the grantor kept the policy
in his own possession, and no notice of the assignment was given to
I Lord Cottenham in Dillon vs. Coppin, 4 My. & Cr. 647; Sir W. Grant in Antro-
bus vs. Smith, 12 Ves. 39.
2 Stated in the Appendix to 3 Sugd. Vend. and Purch. No. xxvii. 10th Ed.
3 3 My. & K. 36.
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the office. The Master of the Rolls supported the assignment as
against the assignor, on the ground that all had been done of which
the subject was capable. The other case was that of Blakely vs.
Brady,' before Lord Plunkett in Ireland, in which he went to the
length of holding, that a voluntary assignment by deed, (with an
irrevocable power of attorney however,) in trust, of a debt, was
valid, though no title passed at law; and the administrator of the
assignor was declared a trustee.
These cases differ from those 'mentioned before, in adopting
as the test, whether the party had done all he could, not whether
the property was capable of transfer at all. On this point they
might, until recently, have been considered overruled. In .Edwards
vs. Jones,' Lord Cottenham obviously considers Sloane vs. Cadogan
and .Fortescue vs. Barnett very doubtful authorities for the length
to which they are cited. Sir Edward Sugden, whose opinion in
such matthrs is of the greatest weight, disapproved of the former.3
Sir Launcelot Shadwell, in Beatson vs. Beatson,4 comments at
length on it, and considers it sustainable on different grounds from
those stated by Sir W. Grant; or else "the decision would not have
been -right." Lord Langdale, in Ward vi. Audland,5 in a very
similar case to Fortescue vs. Barnett, came to an opposite conclu-
sion. And Sir J. Wigram in Meek vs. Kettlewell,6 intimates his dis-
sent from Sloane vs. Cadogan, in very distinct terms. The case of
12 Drc. & Walsh, 311. 2 ' My. & Cr. 238. 3 3 Vend. Purch. 297.
4 13 Sim. 281. See to same effect Holloway vs. Headington, & Id. 324.
5 8 Beav. 201.
6 1 Hare 474. On appeal (1 Phil. 341,) Lord Lyndhurst affirmed this case, which
was that of the voluntary assignment by deed of a mere expectancy; he distin-
guished it from Sloane vs. Cadogan, on the ground that in the latter thereversionary
interestwas vested; while in the one before him nothing could pass presently in any
way. But expectancies and possibilities may be assigned in equity for a conside-
ration, so as to create a trust as well as vested interests. If then Sloane vs. Cado-
gan were right in asserting the criterion to be the assignor's "doing all in hii
power" to make the transfer; it is difficult to understand why the assignment in
Meek vs. Kettlewell was held insufficient.
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Antrobus vs. Smith,1 on the othet band, is recognized and approved
by Lord Cottenham in Dillon vs. Coppin.2
The doctrine then that the later cases establish is that a volun-
tary assignment which cannot operate on the fegal title, amounts to
an agreement to transfer only, and cannot be enforced in equity.
For unless that title so passes, the donee or his trustees can never
make the gift effectual with using the donor's name to sue at law;
and to get the right to do this he or they must (at least theoreti-
cally) ask the aid of-a Court of Chancery.
It now remains to consider the case which has given rise to the
foregoing remarks- ekewith vs. Manning.3  There, the report
states, R. Kekewitch had bequeathed his stocks, funds and securities,
to "his wife Elizabeth and his daughter Susannah, in trust for the
wife, for her life, remainder to his daughter, absolutely; and ap-
pointed his wife and daughter executrices of the will." , By a settle-
ment made in contemplation of marriage, the daughter assigned
during the mother's life, her interest under the will to trustees,4 on
certain trusts for the issue of the intended marriage, and a niece, as
tenants in common; and in case there should be no issue of the
marriage or they did not survive the mother, then, after life estates,
to the niece. The mother was not a party to this settlement, but
had notice of it before her death. The husband died shortly after
the marriage and there was no issue ; and no transfer of the fund was
ever made. Susannah, then Lady Farrington, then being about to
marry again, made a settlement of the same property to other trustees
in trust for the issue of the second marriage; with a remainder as
before to the niece. There was issue of this marriage, one child.
The trustees of the first settlement then filed a bill against the
second set of trustees, Susannah, and the child, to have the stock
transferred by Lady Farrington to the first trustees ; that the trusts
of the first settlement might be executed; and that Lady Farring-
1 18 Yes. 39. 2 4 My. & Cr. 671; see also Jefferys vs. Jefferys, Cr. & Ph.
120. See Hill on Trustees, 83, &c. Notes to Ellison vs. Ellison, 1 Lead. Cas. Eq.
210, &c., for a similar view of the authorities.
3Ut. Supra. 4 There was also a power of attorney in the deed, but no
nptice is taken of this in the opinion of the Court.
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ton might be restrained from transferring the fund into the names
of the trustees of the second settlement. Here -was obviously a
case of the very strongest kind vigainst the interference of the
Court. The interest was equitable, reversionary, and in property
in action alone. The person against whom the deed was to be
enforced, and that by the most stringent means at the disposal of
a Chancellor, was the voluntary assignor herself, who had actually
revoked it before it had ever been acted on. The circumstances to
which the settlement was intended to apply had entirely changed;
and its anticipations had proved unfounded. The whole transaction
certainly appears in itself inchoate, imperfect, and ambulatory;
while the attempt of the niece to avail herself of this chance, this
obvious slip of the counsel who advised or the scrivener who drew
the first deed, in order to appropriate a large part of the fortune
of the child of the second marriage, is shocking to the natural
feelings of every man. The rule must have been an unbending one
indeed, and the precedents most ancient and harmonious which
could force a Court of equity to submit to be the engine of such
gross injustice. The Vice Chancellor, acting probably on some
such idea, dismissed the bill with costs; but the Lord Justices
reversed the decree, and held that the first assignment of Lady
Farrington was irrevocable, and should be sustained.
-The opinion of the Court was delivered by Sir Knight Bruce,
and is characterized by the usual lucidity and force of that learned
Judge. It was fully concurred in by Lord Cranworth, the present
Chancellor, and must be understood, unless reversed by the House
of Lords, to have laid down for the future the doctrine of equity on
this much vexed subject. Our limits do not permit us to refer at
any length to the case, which, indeed, is readily accessible to our
readers; but we may state in a few words the conclusions estab-
lished.
The basis and ground work of the whole argument is to be found
in the broad and sweeping proposition announced by the Court at
the outset. It was said to be clear on legal and equitable princi-
ples, "that a person 8ui juri8, acting freely, fairly and with suffi-
cient knowledge, ought to have, and lia8 it in htis power, to make,
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in a binding and effectual manner, a voluntary gift of any part of
his property, whether capable or incapable of manual delivery,
whether in possession or reversionary, and howsoever circumstanced."
This being admitted, it of course reduces the whole matter to the
extremely narrow question, as to the mode by which the gift is to
be effected; and doubtless, as the Court remarks, there is no better
or more effectual way of doing this, than by an assignment. As to
the doctrine, usually stated in such unqualified terms, with regard
to the enforcement of voluntary deeds and agreements, which would
interfere to check, in many cases, the practical application of this
principle, admitted to be true, it is disposed of in these cautious
words: ," It is probably, or certainly in some instances the course
of this jurisdiction, to decline acting at the suit of those whom it
terms 'volunteers.' * * * But whatever rule there may be
against these, it does not apply to the case of one who, in the lan-
guage of this Court, is termed a cestui que trust, claiming against
his trustee; for what is considered by this jurisdiction a trust, may
certainly be created gratuitously." It is not stated directly,
indeed, that an assignment is equivalent to a declaration of trust;
but it is necessarily the suppressed premise of the enthymeme; and
is also to be inferred from another part of the opinion, where it is
intimated "1 that an instrument may be effectual as a declaration of
trust, though it contain not the word 'confidence,' the word 'trust,'
or the word 'trustee."' On principle, the Court therefore hold,
that a voluntary settlement of an equitable reversionary interest is
perfectly binding, and may be enforced as against the settler.
With regard to the authorities, Sloane vs. Cadoqan and 1ortescue
vs. Bennett, are approved and followed, while Colman vs. Sarel,
Antrobus vs. Smith, Edwards vs. Jones, and a string of other
casesi so far as they contravene or are contravened by the former,
I Sixteen of these are cited by the Lord Justice, to which may be added Sewell
vs. Moxey, 2 Sim. (N. S ) 182; 12 Eng. L. Eq. 304, decided a few days after
Kekewitch vs. Manning, and apparently in ignorance of it, in which V. 0. Kinders-
ley treats the ineffectuality of a voluntary assignment by deed poll of a chose in
action, as too clear for argument. On the other side are but three cases, for
Wheatley vs. Purr, 1 Keen, 551, (particularly in connection with Lord Langdale's
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(which the Court, however, thought it unnecessary to express any
opinion on,) or were opposed to the plaintiff's title to relief, are
overruled.
One question, indeed, the Court still leave open-the effect of
the absence of notice to the debtor, in the case of a chose in action,
or the trustee, in that of an equitable interest. But though some
stress has been laid on this, in one or two prior cases, it can hardly
be very material now, in the view which the Court, in the case
before us, take of the subject. .For, it might well be asked, what
right could debtor or trustee have to resist any dispotition, volun-
tarily or otherwise; and, therefore, why should they need any
information with regard thereto ? It could he only with reference
to the intervening claims of third persons, that notice could be
necessary, so as to protect against an ignorant or innocent mispay-
menlt.
The foregoing appears to be a fair abridgment of the reasoning
of the Court. With the utmost deference to the opinion of the two
extremely able and experienced equity judges, from whom that
reasoning proceeds, we must confess that we do not find it so satis-
factory or conclusive as that which has, certainly in a majority of
the cases, been accepted. It appears to us, in the first place, that
what we have seen to be laid down as the fundamental proposition,
is merely a begging of the whole question. It is certainly the
reverse of true, as a "legal principle," that "a man has the power
to make a voluntary gift of any part of his property," for at law,
as to all but property in possession, and vested reversionary inte-
rests in real estate, he cannot transfer his title even for a consider-
ation. Then as an "equitable principle," whence does it arise?
A Court of Chancery only gets over this imperative prohibitibn
against the assignment of possibilities and choses in action,' where
there is consideration, on the ground of such assignment being a
subsequent decision in Ward vs. Audland, 8 Bear. 201,) and Ellison vs. Ellison, ut
supra, can hardly be deemed very direct authorities on the particular point on
either side.
I Created, says Lord Coke, 10 Rep. 48, "by the great wisdom and policy of the
sages and founders of our law."
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contract or engagement, which must be specifically performed, and
not because it operates in any way oh the debt or reversionary
interest itself.' In order, therefore, to uphold such an assignment
when voluntary merely, it must be established that a Court of
Equity is ever known to enforce specifically a contract or engage-
ment, where there is no consideration. Then, in the next place,
as to the assumption that an assignment may be treated as a
declaration of trust; though it is true that no particular words are,
needed for this; yet the two things -are inherently different. An
assignment effectual at law, creates no trust in equity; why should
it do so, if ineffectual ? The assignor, indeed, might be willing to
give, in a way to disembarras's himself altogether of the property,
and yet be very reluctant to assume the character and duties of a
trustee for his beneficiary.
There is one more observation which we have to make, in con-
clusion, upon this decision. In asserting the power of one entitled
to a'reversionary equitable interest, stock, &c., to make an effectual
transfer of it by way of gift, Sir Knight Bruce remarks, "Surely
it would not be consistent with natural equity, with reason, or with
expediency, to hold the contrary." To this, the answer is written
distinctly on the front'of the case itself, -which shows the danger of
treating as absolute and irrevocable, a settlement intended to meet
only a particular set of circumstances, which in fact never arose.
In family arrangements, and voluntary transactions in general, it
seems to us, on the contrary, that wherever practicable and con-
sistent with the rules of law, a large lucus pcenitentie should be
allowed. If in the case of testamentary bounty, though his
errors of judgment can in no wise affect the donor, he is given
unlimited capacity to revoke and alter his dispositions, and indeed
where, when such errors might affect the interests of others, as in
the case of the unforseen marriage of the testator, or birth of a
child, the prior arrangements are ipso facto revoked, in whole or
part, why ought not as much latitude be permitted where th6
instrument is to operate against the grantor himself, and at once.
1 See Lord Hardwicke, in Wright v8. Atkens, 1 Ves. Sr. 412.
